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MAN-MADE ORGANISMS RECEIVE PATENT PROTECTION
Diamond v. Chakrabarly, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980)
In Diamond v. Chakrabartyt the United States Supreme Court for
the first time2 included a man-made, genetically cross-bred3 bacterium
within the scope of patentable subject matter.4
Chakrabarty, a General Electric Company microbiologist, 5 filed an
application6 to patent a genetically engineered bacterium 7 capable of
1. 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980).
2. Whether genetically engineered bacteria are patentable subject matter is a matter of first
impression in the federal courts. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979). See G. RosE, PAT-
ENT LAW HANDBOOK 8 (1979); notes 17-18 infra.
3. Genetic cross-breeding involves the hybridization of the genes of an individual plant or
animal whose parents are different varieties of the same species or of different but closely related
species. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 336, 659 (4th unabr. lawyer's ed. 1976). Genetic
cross-breeding leads to efficient production of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, food additives, and
substances used in disposal of industrial waste. See generally Irons & Sears, Patents in Relation to
Microbiology, 29 ANN. REV. OF MICROBIOLOGY 319 (1975).
Congress has held extensive hearings in response to the growing use of genetic cross-breeding in
industry. See Hearings on Genetic Engineering Before the Subcomm. On Science, Technolog; and
Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1977); Recombinant DNA Research of 1977- Hearings on Genetic Engineering Before the Sub-
comm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Hearings on Genetic Engineering Before the Subcomm. on Health of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
Congress has thus far regulated only federally funded genetic research. See 43 Fed. Reg. 60080,
60108, 60134 (1978); 41 Fed. Reg. 27902 (1976). For a thorough discussion of the future benefits
and dangers of genetic cross-breeding, see generally J. RICHARDS, RECOMBINANT DNA: ScI-
ENCE, ETHICS, AND POLITICS (1978); M. ROGERS, BIOHAZARD (1977); Berger, Government Regula-
tion of the Pursuit of Knowledge: The Recombinant DNA Controversy, 3 VT. L. REV. 83 (1978);
Curtiss, Genetic Manipulation of Microorganisnr Potential Bene~fts and Biohazards, 30 ANN. REV.
OF MICROBIOLOGY 507 (1976);.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) defines patentable subject matter and provides: "Whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title." The Court ruled Chakrabarty's bacterium is a "manufacture" or "composi-
tion of matter" under § 101, although it did not specify which category is controlling. 100 S. Ct. at
2207, 2212.
5. General Electric Co. became the real party in interest regarding Chakrabarty's patent
application under 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976), which provides for the assignment of patent applica-
tions by an instrument in writing because Chakrabarty left the employ of General Electric before
trial. See 100 S. Ct. at 2205.
6. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-22 (1976) details specifications regarding patent applications. Chak-
rabarty's application, patent serial No. 260,563, filed June 8, 1972, contained 36-claims divided
into three groups: Processes for producing the bacterium; claims for the bacterium's carrier mate-
rial; and claims for the bacterium itself. 100 S. Ct. at 2205-06. See notes 10-11 infra.
7. 100 S. Ct. at 2205-06. Chakrabarty's genetically engineered bacterium derives from the
genus Pseudomonas, which contains energy generating plasmids to provide a separate hydrocar-
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cleaning oil spills.8 The Patent and Trademark Office 9 examiner' ° re-
jected claims to patent the bacterium, and the Patent and Trademark
Office Board of Appeals affirmed." Although the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals12 reversed'3 and granted the patent, the court later
vacated its judgment' 4 because of a subsequent Supreme Court rul-
bon degradative pathway. Id. The plasmids usually take the form of a closed loop of deox-
yribonucleic acid (DNA), and can direct the synthesis of complex molecules that in turn
determine specific attributes of a plasmid. Bent, Living Matter Found to be Patentable, 11 CONN.
L. REV. 311 (1979).
Naturally occurring bacteria, identified in the past, could degrade some, but not all, oil compo-
nents. Chakrabarty had earlier discovered that the plasmids control the oil degradation abilities
of certain bacteria, and that some of these plasmids can degrade camphor and octane, two compo-
nents of crude oil. 100 St. Ct. at 2205 n.1. See note 8 infra.
8. Prior to Chakrabarty's discovery, oil spills were treated with combinations of natural
bacteria. Because bacterial strains tend to compete with each other, the effectiveness of the degra-
dation of oil elements diminished. See Bent, supra note 7, at 312.
Chakrabarty developed a process in which four different plasmids that were able to degrade
four different oil components could be transferred to and maintained in a single Pseudomonas
bacterium. The Pseudomonas, as it appears in nature, cannot degrade oil. 100 S. Ct. at 2205, 2206
n. 11. The genetically cross-bred Pseudomonas could then degrade oil components unlike any
natural bacterium. Bent, supra note 7, at 311-12. See generally Drazek, Ownershp of Living Orga-
nisms-In re Bergy, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 215, 221-22 (1979); The New Biology, 150 NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE, no. 3,355, 374-75 (Sept. 1976); Comment, Bergy, Flook, andMicroorga-
nisms.4s Patentable Products, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 485, 497-98 (1980).
9. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976) details establishment, officers, and functions of the Patent and
Trademark Office. 35 U.S.C. app. 1 (1976) explains the rules of practice for the office. See Brief
for Respondent at 17, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980). See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 134,
141-45 (1976).
10. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-35 (1976) (containing regulations for the examination of patent
applications).
The examiner granted Chakrabarty's claims for the process and carrier material used in devel-
oping the bacterium, but the examiner denied the claims to the bacterium itself reasoning that, (I)
the bacterium is a product of nature, and (2) as a living thing, the bacterium is not patentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 100 S. Ct. at 2206. See note 6 supra. But see 596 F.2d 952, 971
(C.C.P.A. 1978). See also 91 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (1978); notes 11, 41 infra.
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1976) (provides an appeal to any patent applicant whose claim has
been twice rejected by an examiner). The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals (P.T.O.
Bd.), agreeing with the examiner that living things are not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § I01
(1976), denied Chakrabarty's claims to the bacterium itself. See 100 S. Ct. at 2206 (citing the
unreported decision of the P.T.O. Bd. of Appeals). See also notes 6, 10 supra.
12. 35 U.S.C. app. 1 (1976) establishes the rules of practice for the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.).
13. See In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The C.C.P.A. reversed on the au-
thority of the original decision in In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub nom.
Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978), which held that the living nature of an invention has no
significance for purposes of the patent law. 563 F.2d at 1038. See also note 14 infra.
14. The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks petitioned the C.C.P.A. to vacate its deci-
sion in In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978), because of the Supreme Court's vacation
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ing' 5 that further delineated subject matter limitations of patentabil-
ity. 6 On rehearing, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ap-
proved the patent.'7 The Supreme Court granted the petition for
certiorari 8 and held: A living, man-made bacterium is patentable
under the general patent subject matter statute' 9 that provides patent
protection to any new manufacture or composition of matter.2 °
The patent clause 2' of the United States Constitution, in conjunction
with the necessary and proper clause,22 grants broad congressional
power to patent inventions.2 3 The patenting of inventions provides in-
of Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978) in light of Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). The
C.C.P.A. granted the Commissioner's petition to vacate. See 596 F.2d at 956-57; Brief for Re-
spondent at 9, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980); note 16 infra.
The Supreme Court did not indicate the effect of Parker v. Flook when the Court vacated
Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). See 596 F.2d at 564-67; G. RosE, supra note 2, at 8; note 17
infra.
15. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
16. Id. Writing for the majority in Parker v. Foak, Justice Stevens held that respondent's
method for updating alarm systems during catalytic conversion processes, in which the only novel
feature is a mathematical formula, is not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). In dictum, the
Court advised "caution when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by
Congress." 437 U.S. at 596.
17. See 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979). The C.C.P.A. consolidated In re Berg), and In re
Chakrabarty, noting that, "Ithe only thing we see in common in these cases and Foak is that they
all involve § 101." Id. at 964. "[Tlhe Floak holding appears to have no bearing." Id. at 965. The
C.C.P.A. reaffirmed its holding that because the invention is living does not exclude it from the
purview of 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Id. at 973. See also 100 S. Ct. at 2211. But see 596 F.2d at
988-99 (Miller, J., dissenting); Brief for Respondent at 10, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct.
2204 (1980). See general, Drazek, supra note 8, at 225.
18. See 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both In re Bergy and
In re Chakrabarty. Id. Subsequently, the Court dismissed In re Bergy as moot when Bergy can-
celed the claim to the bacterium itself. 100 S. Ct. at 2206.
19. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
20. See 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980).
21. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides: "Congress shall have the Power. . . To promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
This provision grants Congress power to establish both a patent system and a copyright system.
See genera/ly Lutz, Patents and Science A Clarifiation of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Consitu-
tion, 18 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 50 (1949); Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
383 (1980).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 provides: "Congress shall have Power. . . To make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers .... "
23. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) currently defines patentable inventions. See note 4 supra. See
generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. at 2204; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Hartranft v. Wiegman, 121 U.S. 609
(1887); American Wood Paper Co. v. Fiber Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 (1874); In re
Johnston, 94 F.2d 978 (C.C.P.A. 1938); Inre Fink, 63 F.2d 103 (C.C.P.A. 1932). See also Noonan,
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centive for innovation and research24 although the duration of a patent
is limited.25 Congress historically has used broad language in patent
legislation.2 6  The judiciary has interpreted patent legislation liber-
ally, 27 recognizing both the constitutional patent mandate and the lan-
guage used by Congress in exercising this mandate.28 The breadth of
the patent subject matter statute, however, has been a source of contro-
versy.2 9
Conflicting rules of statutory interpretation,3" which the Court has
implemented 31 in defining patentable subject matter, fuel this contro-
versy. In United States v. Dubier Condenser Corp. 32 the Court warned
Patentability ofMicroorganisms: Legal Control of Lfe, 47 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 130, 133-36 (1978);
McDonald, The Patentability o(Living Organisms Under 35 U.S. C. 101: In re Bergy, 58 NEB. L.
REv. 303, 303-05 (1979).
24. In Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 F. 358 (7th Cir. 1907),
the Seventh Circuit noted that "inventive minds may fail to produce many useful things that they
would produce if stimulated by the promise of substantial reward ....... Accord, Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10
(1966); Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944); Boehringer Sohn v. Watson, 256
F.2d 713, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (Burger, J., concurring). Cf. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v.
Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945) (patent laws designed for technological advance-
ment, not for individual reward); Kendell v. Wilson, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 329 (1859) (rights and
welfare of the community must be guarded when awarding patents). See generally Guttage, The
Patentability of Microorganirms: Statutory Subject Matter and Other Living Things, 13 U. RICH. L.
REv. 247 (1979); Comment, Bergy, Flook, and Microorganisms as Patentable Subject Matter, 29
CATH. U.L. REv. 485 (1980), See also 100 S. Ct. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (patent laws
balance antipathy to monopolies with need to encourage progress).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) sets 17 years as the maximum duration of a patent. During this
period, the patent holder obtains the right to prevent others from making, using, or selling the
invention. Id.
26. See 100 S. Ct. at 2207.
27. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974); Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966); Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
28. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
29. See 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980). See also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959-64 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
30. Canons of statutory interpretation are not rules of law, but are aids to ascertain legislative
intent. These canons must yield to evidence of contrary intent, and are only useful in doubtful
cases. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); City of New York v. Train, 420 U.S. 35,
44-45 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
458 (1974); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951); Utah Junk Co. v. Porter,
328 U.S. 39, 44 (1945); United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 753 (1946). See generally F. DICKER-
SON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975); 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed. 1974).
31. Justice Frankfurter noted: "Insofar as canons of construction are generalizations of expe-
rience, they all have worth. In the abstract, they rarely arouse controversy. Difficulties emerge
when canons compete in soliciting judgment, because they conflict rather than converge." Frank-
furter, Some Re/tections on the Reading of Statutes, reprintedin 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 544 (1947).
32. 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/13
Number 1] PATENT PROTECTION FOR MAN-MADE ORGANISMS 265
against reading unexpressed limitations into the patent laws.33 The
Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. 34 similarly held that a narrow inter-
pretation would undermine the intent and goals of the patent laws. 35
The Court in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp .,36 however,
preached judicial caution regarding liberal interpretation of patent
laws by demanding a "clear and certain signal from Congress" before
expanding patent rights.37 The Court, therefore, has been alternately
willing38 and reluctant39 to liberally interpret the patent laws.4"
Other canons of legislative interpretation exacerbate the controversy
that arises when statutes coexist within the same area of law.41 The
Court's legislative interpretations have yielded the following maxims: 42
Congress is presumed not to legislate superfluously; 43 courts should
read statutes dealing with the same subject matter in unison to ascer-
tain congressional intent;" courts cannot apply the intent of one Con-
33. Id. at 199.
34. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
35. Id. at 7-10. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
36. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
37. Id. at 531.
38. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1 (1966); Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471 (1944); United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933). See also note 50 infra and accompanying text.
39. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gotschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1973); Deep-
south Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972); Funk Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
333 U.S. 127 (1948). See also note 49 infra and accompanying text.
40. Although the Constitution and congressional enactments encourage patents, the Court
has been consistently unwilling to allow patents in certain areas, such as products of nature. See
note 5 supra and accompanying text. Justice Brennan noted: "The patent laws attempt to recon-
cile this Nation's deep seated antipathy to monopolies with the need to encourage progress." 100
S. Ct. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
41. Whether there is companion legislation to the general patent subject matter statute is
itself a matter of interpretation. See note 4supra. In 1930 and 1970, Congress enacted legislation
allowing patents for certain types of plants. See notes 52-59 infra and accompanying text. Be-
cause these Acts permitted the patenting of specific living things, and because Chakrabarty's bac-
terium is living, it is arguable that it too needs a congressional act to be patentable. Compare 100
S. Ct. at 2209-10 (no reason to exclude living things from patentability) with 100 S. Ct. at 2213-14
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (if living things patentable, Plant Acts superfluous). See notes 79-91 infra
and accompanying text.
42. See notes 30-31 supra.
43. See Tungus v. Skorgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959). Accord, Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99
U.S. 48 (1878); In re Finch, 535 F.2d 70 (C.C.P.A. 1976); United States v. Korpan, 237 F.2d 676
(7th Cir. 1956).
44. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). Accord, Kokoszka v. Belford, 417
U.S. 642, 650 (1974); Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis, 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973); NLRB
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gress to the intent of another;45 specific terms prevail over general terms
in a statute or companion statutes;46 and the inclusion of one subject in
a statute implies the exclusion of other subjects from the statute or
companion statutes.47
Conflicts also arise when courts determine whether the scope of pat-
entable subject matter encompasses living things.4  Although courts
consistently have held that products of nature are not patentable,49 the
courts have issued numerous patents for inventions utilizing products
of nature, including living things50 used to create these inventions.51
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1967); Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d
231, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1969).
45. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1968). Accord, United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326 (1963); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304,
310 (1960); Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590 (1958); United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258,
272 (1947).
46. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 22 (1957). Accord, MacEvoy Co.
v. United States, 322 U.S. 102 (1944); Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204 (1932).
47. EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1975); Arley v. United Pac. Ins.
Co., 379 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1967).
48. See notes 4 supra, 50-59 infra.
49. 100 S. Ct. at 2206. Courts hold products of nature unpatentable because they are not new
as required by 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See note 4 supra. As the Supreme Court stated in
Chakrabarty: "The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not
patentable." 100 S. Ct. at 2208. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (mathematical
algorithm); Gotschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1973) (numerical code for computer program);
Funk Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (mixed bacteria cultures); Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939) (improvements to antenna system);
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853) (electro-magnetic signals); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853) (improvements to pipemaking machinery); In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d
1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (prostaglandin compounds); Exparte Latimer, 46 O.G. 1638 (1889) (deci-
sion of the Commissioner of Patents, 1889 C.D. 123) (fiber in trees). See general I A. DELLER,
WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 22-23 (2d ed. 1964); Kip, The Patentability of Natural Phenomena, 20
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 371 (1952).
Latimer is the seminal case for the proposition that plants, as products of nature, are not patent-
able. The Court in Chakrabarqy reasoned that because the organism in question is not a product
of nature, but a man-made invention, the Latimer presumption against the patentability of living
things was overcome. 100 S. Ct. at 2208-10.
50. See, e.g., In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (process for production of antibi-
otic); Merck v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958) (purification process for
vitamin B-12); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934) (process
for sewage purification); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931),
efl'd, 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932) (process for producing butyl-alcohol); Parke-Davis v. Mulford,
196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (process for purification of adrenalin); Village of Saratoga Springs v.
Cameron Septic Tank Co., 159 F. 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 209 U.S. 548 (1908) (process using
organisms in sewage disposal); Brief for Respondent at 10, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct.
2204 (1980). See generally Irons & Sears, Patents in Relation to Microbiology, 29 ANN. REv. OF
MICROBIOLOGY 319 (1975).
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Congress approved patents on certain living things5 2 in the Plant Pat-
ent Act of 1930,11 which authorized patent protection to breeders of
specified asexually54 produced plants." In 1970 the enactment of the
Plant Variety Protection Act56 brought certain sexualy 5 7 produced
plants within the scope of patentable subject matter. The 1970 Act also
provides an express exclusion of bacteria from patent protection.58
Courts have not interpreted the 1930 or 1970 Acts to allow patenting of
any living things, except plants themselves.59
51. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1976) defines "process" as "The ... process, art, or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or mate-
rial." See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) for a definition of "process" as a "mode of
treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or series of acts, performed on
the subject matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state of thing."
The examiner approved patents for the process used by Chakrabarty to breed his bacterium.
See also note 10 supra.
52. Courts previously had allowed patenting of a process utilizing living things, but not a
living thing itself. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976). The express legislative purpose of the 1930 Plant Patent Act is
"to afford agriculture. . . the same. . . benefits of the patent system as has been given industry."
S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930); H. R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930).
See 100 S. Ct. at 2209.
54. Asexual reproduction is reproduction other than by union of male and female cells.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1219 (4th unabr. lawyers' ed. 1976).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976) provides patent protection to inventors of any new asexually re-
produced plant, including cultivated spores, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other
than a tuber propagated plant, or a plant found in an uncultivated state. See generally R. ALLYN,
THE FIRST PLANT PATENTS (1934); 3 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS ch. IX (2d ed. 1964).
In In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940), the C.C.P.A. held that bacteria are not plants
for purposes of the 1930 Plant Patent Act. See note 58 infra and accompanying text.
56. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1976); Plant Variety Protection Act.- Hearing Before the Sub-
comm on Agricultural Res. & General Legislation of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1970); S. REP. No. 91-1138, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP. No. 91-
1138, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5082; H. R.
REP. No. 91-1246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) reprintedin [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5082.
57. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1976) provides: "The breeder of any novel variety of sexually repro-
duced plant (other than fungi, bacteria or first generation hybrids). . . shall be entitled to plant
variety protection .. " The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 is incorporated into the Agri-
culture title of 7 U.S.C., rather than the patent title of 35 U.S.C., but provides protection similar to
the 1930 Plant Patent Act. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976) with 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976).
58. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1976). The legislative history gives no reason for the exclusion of
bacteria from coverage. See 100 S. Ct. at 2210. But cf Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893)
(scientific definition of a word not controlling in statutory interpretation); In re Arzberger, 112
F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940) ("plants," as used in 1930 Plant Patent Act, is used in its common
meaning so as to exclude bacteria).
59. See In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (bacteria are not plants for purposes of
1930 Plant Patent Act).
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In Diamond v. Chakrabary6° the Supreme Court reasoned that be-
cause a genetically cross-bred bacterium is not a product of nature,61
but a manufacture or composition of matter 62 under the general patent
subject matter statute,63 the bacterium is patentable subject matter.Y
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,65 analyzed the history of
the patent laws,66 and concluded that although Congress intended the
laws to be interpreted liberally,67 it did not intend courts to interpret
them without limitations.68 The Court determined that because
Chakrabarty's bacterium does not occur naturally, it is therefore pat-
entable.69 The majority held that neither the 1930 Plant Patent Act,7°
nor the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act7' demonstrate a legislative
intent to deny patentability to living things unless expressly permitted
by congressional act. 72 Moreover, the Court determined that an ab-
sence of legislative history regarding the exclusion of bacteria from pat-
entability in the 1970 Act does not demonstrate a legislative intent to
exclude bacteria from patentability under the general patent subject
matter statute.73
60. 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980).
61. Id at 2208. See note 49 supra.
62. 100 S. Ct. at 2209. See generaly 1 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 17-18 (2d ed.
1964). See also American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931); P.E. Sharp-
less Co. v. Crawford Farms, Inc., 287 F. 655, 658 (2d Cir. 1923); Hotel Security Checking Co. v.
Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908); Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280
(D.D.C. 1957), aj'd, 252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
64. 100 S. Ct. at 2212.
65. Id at 2205. The decision was 5-4.
66. Id at 2206-08.
67. id at 2207. Accord, Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S.
147, 154 (1950) (Douglas J., concurring).
68. 100 S. Ct. at 2208. See note 49 supra.
69. 100 S. Ct. at 2208.
70. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976).
71. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1976).
72. 100 S. Ct. at 2208-10. ChiefJustice Burger, after discussing the legislative history of the
1930 Plant Patent Act, concluded that Congress realized the distinction between patentable and
unpatentable subject matter is "not between living and inanimate things, but between products of
nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions." Id at 2210. The Chief Justice rea-
soned that the 1930 Act was needed because plants had only recently come within the scope of
"human-made inventions." Chief Justice Burger found the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act
inconclusive for similar reasons. Id.
73. Id. The Court applied the maxim that absent some clear indication that Congress fo-
cused on the issue at bar, there is no reason for interpreting its actions as modifying the plain
meaning of 35 U.S.C § 101 (1976). Id Accord, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-93 (1978); SEC v.
Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 120-21 (1978); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). Contra,
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The majority dismissed warnings of judicial usurpation of congres-
sional powers7 4 and potential dangers of genetic engineering75 by
claiming that the Court simply performed the judicial function of inter-
preting existing legislation.76 The Court concluded that although Con-
gress may enact legislation in the future that forbids patenting of man-
made life forms, the general patent subject matter statute presently en-
compasses such life forms.7 7
Justice Brennan in dissent78 felt that the majority misread the appli-
cable legislation.79 Justice Brennan viewed the 1930 and 1970 Plant
Acts as evidence that Congress intended to exclude living things, par-
ticularly bacteria,80 from patentability. He objected to the implicit as-
sumption of the majority that Congress acted superfluously in passing
the Acts.8" Justice Brennan concluded that the majority extended the
patent system beyond its intended scope.8 2
Although all the Justices agreed that courts should interpret the pat-
ent laws liberally,83 the majority's inclusion of man-made bacteria
United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 310 (1976) ("the absence of specific legislative history in
no way modifies the conventional judicial duty to give faithful meaning to language Congress
adopted"). See notes 30-31 supra.
74. 100 S. Ct. at 2210. See generally Bent, Living Mailer Found to be Patentable: In re
Chakrabarty, II CONN. L. REv. 311, 328 (1979).
75. 100 S. Ct. at 2211-12. See note 3 supra.
76. 100 S. Ct. at 2212.
77. Id. Congress has, however, had the opportunity to address the question of the patentabil-
ity of living things other than plants but has failed to act. When Congress enacted the 1952 Patent
Act, ch. 950, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976)), no mention
was made of patenting living organisms. See generally Bent, Living Matter Found To Be Patenta-
ble." In re Chakrabarty, I1 CONN. L. REv. 311, 325 (1979).
78. 100 S. Ct. at 2212 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was joined by Justice White,
Justice Marshall, and Justice Powell.
79. Id. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent viewed the 1930 Plant Patent Act and
the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act as evidence that Congress had included some specific life
forms, ie., plants, within the scope of patentable subject matter, thereby excluding other life
forms. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
80. Justice Brennan saw the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act's exclusion of bacteria from
the scope of protected subject matter as dispositive. 100 S. Ct. at 2214 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Although admitting the majority's point that the 1970 Act gave no reason for the exclusion of
bacteria, Justice Brennan did not take this as giving the Court a "license to invent reasons." Id
See note 73 supra.
81. 100 S. Ct. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id at 2214 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. The majority noted that "Congress plainly contemplated the patent laws would be given
wide scope" and adhered to this premise throughout its opinion. Id. at 2207. The dissent, relying
heavily on the warnings of Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), and Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), to exercise caution when extending patent rights, refused to
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within the purview of patentable subject matter is unwarranted. The
Court dogmatically adheres to liberal canons of construction8 4 to reach
its conclusion, and fails to recognize that other maxims of legislative
interpretation become relevant when companion legislation exists.85
Liberal interpretation of the general patent subject matter statute is
proper if companion legislation does not exist 86 because the broad con-
gressional language and the goals of the patent laws would warrant
broad construction. 87 Because companion legislation does exist, how-
ever, courts cannot consider the patentability of a man-made bacterium
in a legislative vacuum.8 8 Courts must acknowledge the 1930 and 1970
Plant Acts because the Acts further delineate the limits of patentable
subject matter by defining the living things that are patentable.8 9
Congress is presumed not to legislate superfluously. 90 Justice Bren-
nan in dissent9' properly argued that if living things were patentable
under the general patent subject matter statute, the 1930 and 1970 Plant
Acts would have been unnecessary.92
interpret the broad language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) as liberally. See 100 S. Ct. at 2213 & n.2
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966); United States v. Dubilier Con-
denser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933). See also notes 32, 34 supra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 43-44, 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
86. If the statutory interpretation involved only 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), the broad language
Congress used in that section would justify a broad interpretation. See note 4 supra. But as the
Court said in Platt v. Union Pac. R.R., 99 U.S. 48, 66 (1879), statutes must be construed "in
connection with all the other provisions made by Congress, endeavoring to give effect to every
part." See note 44 supra.
As the dissent noted, the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act added
to the scope of patentable subject matter. If 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) covered plants, the 1930 and
1970 Acts would have been superfluous. 100 S. Ct. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see note
45 supra and accompanying text.
87. 100 S. Ct. at 2207.
88. Id at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court in Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642,
650 (1974), refused to interpret legislation without considering "the whole statute or statutes on
the same subject .... "
89. 100 S. Ct. at 2213.
90. See notes 43, 86 supra.
91. 100 S. Ct. at 2212 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Id at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that even if the 1930 Plant
Patent Act and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act are not evidence of congressional intent to
exclude bacteria from patentability, the warnings of caution by the Court in Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584 (1978), and Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), see note 83
supra, not to extend patent rights would be dispositive. "I should think the necessity for caution is
that much greater when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas Congress has foreseen and
considered [such as the patentability of living things] but has not resolved." 100 S.Ct. at 2213 n.2
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 43, 86 supra.
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The Court also should have followed other relevant canons of con-
struction.93 For example, courts should read the general patent subject
matter statute and the 1930 and 1970 Plant Acts together to ascertain
congressional intent.94 The specific inclusion of living things in the
1930 and 1970 Plant Acts implied the exclusion of living things from
the general patent subject matter statute even though courts cannot ap-
ply the intentions of one Congress to another.95
Congress not only failed to include bacteria within the scope of pat-
entable subject matter in the 1930 and 1970 Plant Acts, but also ex-
pressly excluded bacteria from patentability in the 1970 Act.96 In
Deepsouth97 the Court demanded a "clear and certain signal" from
Congress before expanding patent rights.9" The Chakrabarty Court ar-
gued that a lack of legislative history on the exclusion of bacteria in the
1970 Act renders the exclusion impotent. This assumption undermines
the Deepsouth requirement because Congress clearly and certainly ex-
cluded bacteria from coverage in the 1970 Plant Act.99
The Court could have avoided confusion by recognizing numerous
maxims of interpretation that arise when companion legislation ex-
ists,"° and by adhering to the Deepsouth t0 l requirement. Because all
of the Justices agreed 0 2 that Congress will send a "clear and certain
signal" to the judiciary regarding the patentability of genetically-bred
life forms in the future, precedent compels patience. 0 3
93. See notes 43-47 supra.
94. See notes 44, 86 supra.
95. See note 45 supra. As the Court in United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) noted,
"the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier
one." See notes 48-49 supra.
96. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1976). See notes 58, 95 supra.
97. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
98. Id at 531.
99. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1976). See note 57 supra.
100. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
101. 406 U.S. 518 (1972). See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
102. 100 S. Ct. at 2212; id at 2214 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S.
518 (1972). See notes 83, 92 supra.
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